Tag: Selling
Windlab
The Case for Windlab
. | 2017 | 2016 | 2015 |
Revenue | $ 24,515,379 | $ 18,101,100 | $ 10,012,006 |
Expenses | -$ 10,098,372 | -$ 13,023,113 | -$ 8,524,804 |
Profit before income tax | $ 14,417,007 | $ 5,077,987 | $ 1,487,202 |
Income tax | -$ 4,912,534 | -$ 1,779,491 | $ 14,687 |
Profit | $ 9,504,473 | $ 3,298,496 | $ 1,501,889 |
Equity at the start of the year | $ 13,404,230 | $ 9,207,680 | $ 7,699,065 |
ROE | 71% | 36% | 20% |
Average | 42% | ||
The company is able to achieve this sort of ROE as windfarm developments are sold once all approvals and agreements signed but before construction begins, meaning developing multi-million dollar projects does not require significant capital. For example, take the site of the Coonooer bridge wind farm, a 19.8 megawatt wind farm in North Western Victoria with a total development cost of $48.6 million. After identifying the site with Windscape, Windlab spent only $300,000 in acquiring the land, then spent $2.2 million or research and planning applications for a total investment of only $2.5 million. Windlab then sold 96.5% of the equity in the Coonoer Bridge to Eurus Energy for just over $4.7 million who then funded the construction of the site with help from grants from the state government. In total, Windlab walked away from this transaction with over $4.7 million in cash and a remaining 3.5% stake in the project, a return of over 111% on the initial investment.
Valuation
- 640 megawatts of approved potential capacity across multiple projects in South Africa. (While South African Renewable Energy projects have been on hiatus, it does seem the projects are about to get up and running again after a recent change of government
- 250 megawatt project in Northern Queensland that Windlab is intending to submit a development application for in 2019
- 230 megawatt project in Vedigre USA that Windlab no longer has control over, but is eligible for up to $4.6 million in success payments if the project reaches financial close.
Project | Value |
Lakeland | $ 10,200,000.00 |
East African projects | $ 42,300,000.00 |
Greenwich | $ 2,800,000.00 |
Other projects | $ 15,000,000.00 |
Total | $ 70,300,000.00 |
Book value | $ 9,690,000.00 |
three years of annual costs | $ 19,200,000.00 |
tax on projected profit | $ 12,423,000.00 |
Value after tax | $ 38,677,000.00 |
Area | Value |
Development Projects | $ 38,677,000.00 |
Operating wind farms | $ 52,770,000.00 |
Asset Management business | $ 8,500,000.00 |
Windscape software | $ 10,000,000.00 |
Cash | $ 14,622,414.00 |
Liabilities | -$ 10,755,130.00 |
Total | $ 113,814,284.00 |
Shares outstanding (diluted) | 73848070 |
Price | $ 1.54 |
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The post How EDI and eCommerce Work With 3PL Partners first appeared on Ottawa Logistics.Cannabis and Cobalt
Company | Listing price | Current price | Return |
Wattle Health | $ 0.20 | $ 2.26 | 1030% |
Cann Group | $ 0.30 | $ 2.75 | 817% |
Bubs | $ 0.10 | $ 0.72 | 620% |
Titomic | $ 0.20 | $ 1.22 | 510% |
Cobalt blue | $ 0.20 | $ 1.40 | 600% |
Buy My Place
Buy My Place - Quarterly cash flows since listing (thousands)
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The competition
Buy My Place and Purple bricks H1FY18 (Millions)
Purple Bricks | PB costs/revenue | Buy My Place | BMP costs/revenue | |
Revenue | 6.8 | 1.57 | ||
Cost of sales | -3.2 | 47% | -0.53 | 34% |
Gross Profit | 3.6 | 53% | 1.04 | 66% |
Administrative expenses | -3 | 44% | -2.97 | 189% |
Sales and marketing | -5.7 | 84% | -0.87 | 55% |
Operating loss | -5.1 | 75% | -2.80 | 178% |
Valuation and Verdict
Simble
Background
Products
Simble historically has received the bulk of its income from Simble Mobility. A good example of Simble Mobility’s work is the App they developed for Barwon Health’s Cancer Centre for patient registration and booking.
Simble will typically work with an organization to develop an electronic solution for a business process and then develop the software. It is important to note that for a lot of these projects Simble does not actually own the platform that they work on. Instead, Simble has previously used a platform developed and owned by Blink Mobile, another small Australian software company. Simble has an agreement in place to use Blink Mobile’s platform, but is does not look like its exclusive which is a bit of a concern.
Financials
In June 2017, the business had only $182,000 in cash, vs $1,650,000 in payables, $309,000 in employee benefit liabilities, and just under one million in unearned revenue. For a company with negative net cash flows for the six months until June 2017 of -$951,000 this is a pretty major concern. Deloitte seems to have been of the same opinion, as they submitted an emphasis of matter statement regarding the troubling net working capital position when they signed off on the HY16 and and HY17 financial report.
$000 | jan - Jun 2016 | Jul - Dec 2016 | Jan - Jun 2017 |
Revenue | $ 1,090 | $ 1,629 | $ 1,160 |
Cost of Sales | -$ 340 | -$ 810 | -$ 359 |
Gross Profit | $ 751 | $ 819 | $ 801 |
Other Income | $ 300 | $ 455 | $ 348 |
Operating Expenses | $ - | ||
General and Administration | -$& nbsp; 2,243 | -$ 1,823 | -$ 1,637 |
Marketing | -$ 164 | -$ 359 | -$ 62 |
Total Overhead expenses | -$ 2,407 | -$ 2,182 | -$ 1,699 |
EBITDA | -$ 1,355 | -$ 909 | -$ 550 |
Depreceation and Amortisation | -$ 366 | -$ 407 | -$ 462 |
EBIT | -$ 1,721 | -$ 1,316 | -$ 1,012 |
Valuation
Verdict
Croplogic
While in the financial year ending March 2016 the business made a profit of $140,000 AUD, in 2017 this had reduced to a loss of $24,650 (to make things simpler, I am using AUD for both the revenue and purchase price, despite Proag being an American company). This loss was caused mainly by small a decrease in revenue from 2.24 million to 2.14, and an increase in operating costs from $580,000 to $690,000. To be clear, the FY17 financial year ended before Croplogic bought the business, so these costs cannot be easily attributed to acquisition expenses. While there could potentially be other factors that explain the 2017 loss, 2.65 Million seems hugely unreasonable for a company that lost money last financial year, and even seems on the steep side if you just take the FY16 numbers into account. Were Croplogic so desperate to secure an acquisition before the IPO that they ended up paying more than they should have for a struggling company? As an outsider it certainly looks like that.