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Tag: equity

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Xinja

A couple of weeks ago, the first six AFS licenses for crowdfunding were issued, paving the way for Australian companies to raise money from retail investors without listing on the ASX. While I usually restrict this blog to reviewing initial offerings of publicly listed companies, I thought it might be interesting to review one of the first crowdfunding offers in Australia to mark the occasion. There’s something to be said for reviewing a company that doesn’t have a public market for its shares, as you are less likely to end up looking like an idiot.

While a few of the crowdfunding platforms are still in the process of setting up their first offers, Equitise seem to have got the early jump on the competition. Their crowdfunding campaign for Xinja, a start-up digital or "Neo" bank, is already live and at time of writing $1.3 million into their 3 million dollar raise. 

Xinja has ambitious goals. With the recent weakening of laws regarding setting up banks in Australia, they intend to set up a fully functioning Australian bank, complete with deposit accounts and mortgages.

Just in case you forget this is a crowdfunding offer as opposed to your usual boring IPO, they have put together a pitch video, replete with flashy animations and bubbly tech muzak in addition to the standard offer document and financials. Once you look past the executives in torn jeans and distressed-paint walls, you quickly conclude that the pitch seems entirely devoid of anything original. Xinja’s main claim is that they will be the first “100% digital bank,” offering fully online services with no branches, but ME bank has been offering deposit accounts since 2003 in Australia and has never opened a branch. Another big focus of their pitch is that they will develop tools that nudge customers to make better financial decisions, which seems pretty similar to an advertising campaign NAB has been running for years. While the idea of a new digital bank in Australia is in itself is somewhat interesting, it is a shame that this is as far as they have got in terms of originality. Watching Xinja’s pitch video I’m reminded of that old Yes Prime Minister joke, about how boring speeches should be delivered in modern looking rooms with abstract paintings on the walls to disguise the absence of anything new in the actual speech. These days the modern equivalent I guess is a converted warehouse office space and vague references to blockchain.

What makes this paucity of orginality a particular concern is that the challenge faced by Xinja is enormous. There are good reasons why Australia has been dominated by the same big four banks as long as anyone can remember, and it’s not because no one has ever thought of making banking work on your phone. The pitch seems to promote this idea that the big banks are old tired institutions, with needlessly slow and cumbersome processes, just waiting to be pushed aside by some new start-up. As someone who works in the finance industry I know this is far from reality. Banks are obsessed with innovation and change, and are constantly sinking huge amounts of money into technology to stay ahead of the curve. The simple reality is that banking is one of the most heavily regulated industries in Australia. More often than not, what you find frustrating or slow about a bank’s processes is down to legislative restrictions rather than the banks ineptitude or unwillingness to change.

A lot is made in Xinja’s pitch video of the involvement of the founder of Monzo in Xinja. Monzo is another digital/Neo bank that was set up a few years ago in England. In the pitch Monzo is held up as an example of the success of Neo Banking, but this seems like a ridiculously premature thing to say. While Monzo has been through multiple capital raises at increasingly higher valuations, the reality is Monzo’s revenue for 2017 was a paltry $120,000 vs a loss of 6.8 million. It’s true that Monzo has some interesting ideas and managed to pick up an impressive half a million customers thanks to their zero fee pre-paid cards, but it is still far too early to hold them up as some sort of success. If I started handing out free cup cakes at Flinders Street Station I’d probably run out of cup cakes pretty quickly, but it’s hardly proof of a valid business.

The example of Monzo also gives us a good example of just how much capital is needed to start a bank. According to Crunchbase, since June 2015 Monzo has raised a total of 109 million, and given how far they are off profitability more funding rounds are probably on the cards. At each raise the business valuation has increased, but it does demonstrate just how long the road ahead is for Xinja.

Valuation


While it might be considered a bit boring to talk about something as mundane as valuations and financials in the crowdfunding world, it is probably worth noting that Xinja is raising its $3 million dollar campaign at a $43.1 million dollar valuation, higher than the last 5 ASX IPOs I have reviewed on my bl og.
To be blunt, the $43.1 million market capitalisation is completely ridiculous. Reading the “achievements to date” section of the prospectus it is hard to believe someone was able to write this with a straight face. While bullet points like “we have assembled a committed and exceptional team” and “we have completed 80% of our app” might be acceptable when putting together a slide deck at a hackathon, for a company valuing itself at over $40 million dollars it is downright obscene.

Not only does Xinja have no revenue from customers to date, they don’t even have trial products with customers or a license for any type of banking activities in Australia. They have only raised $7.8 million dollars before this crowdfunding campaign, which means that somehow investors are meant to believe that the other $32.3 million of their valuation has been created by coming up with a company name and hiring a few people.

Even Monzo, which seems to have ridden the hype train of ridiculous valuations pretty well, has been more restrained in their valuations. In October 2016 when Monzo valued itself at $50 million pounds, they had already been granted a restricted banking license and had a prepaid cards with a fully developed app out to 50,000 people. Earlier on, Monzo raised 6 million at only a $30 million valuation in March 2016, but at that time had a working trial pre-paid card out to 1,500 people. In contrast, Xinja has not only not yet released the beta version of their prepaid card, they still don’t even have a banking license.

To provide just one more example of how ridiculous the Xinja valuation is, it is worthwhile to look at the ratio of book to market equity. Banking has always been a capital-intensive business, and post-GFC regulations have only made it more so. This means that profits always require significant amounts of capital. The CBA, for all its market advantages from to being the largest bank in Australia has a book to equity ratio of $0.43. This means for every dollar of CBA shares you purchase, you are getting an entitlement to the earnings of $0.43 cents of equity on the CBA balance sheet. For the Xinja crowdfunding campaign, a bank with no license, revenue or market share, that ratio is only $0.22 cents.

On the Xinja Equitise crowdfunding campaign, the offer is described as a bank job. What they don’t tell you though is you’re the one getting robbed.

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Appetise

Appetise are a food ordering website that are seeking to raise between 4.8 and 6.8 million dollars. While they are listing on the ASX, they are so far only located in London, and have no connection to Australia. In a trend that has been growing lately, they seem to have chosen to list in Australia purely due to its lower compliance regulations and associated costs.

Background



By numbers alone, Appetise looks like one of the worst value IPOs I have reviewed on this blog. To explain, let me give a few simple facts presented in Appetise’s own prospectus:



After starting in 2008, Appetise was acquired for only $230,000 in May 2016 by Long Hill, an American investment company. After acquiring the business, Longhill poured $2,260,000 into Appetise to improve the company's website and increase the number of restaurants on the platform. However, despite these investments, revenue decreased from $91,715 in FY16 to $49,172 in FY17. This IPO now values Long Hill’s stake at $9 million, with total market capitallization on listing between 13.8 and 15 million, more than 200 times their 2017 revenue.  If the IPO is successful, this will be a 261% return on investment over 18 months for Long Hill, despite no measurable improvement in Appetise’s performance. If you are getting flash backs of Dick Smith right now, you’re not the only one.


Management




When Long Hill bought Appetise they did the usual private equity thing of installing a completely new management team, getting rid of the original founder in the process. The newly appointed CEO, Konstantine Karampatsos, has had experience both setting up his own online business as well as a stint at Amazon, and the CFO Richard Hately has had a number of senior roles at both start-ups and established businesses. While the CEO and CFO both seem like logical choices, appointing such an experienced management team to a company of this size leads to some pretty ridiculous statistics.

Konstantine Karampatos will have an annual salary of $204,050, post listing, plus a bonus of $122,430. Richard Hately, the CFO, will have a salary of $195,888, and will receive a listing bonus of $81,620. The marketing director will receive a salary of $138,750, though no listing bonus. All up, this is an annual cost of over $700,000 for the three highest paid employees, for a company that had less than $50,000 in revenue last year. Even if Appetise’s FY17 revenue increased by 1000% in FY18, it would still not come close to covering the salary of its three most senior executives.

This is a perfect demonstration of why a public listing at such an early stage is a terrible idea. A $50,000 revenue company should be being run out of a garage or basement somewhere by a few dedicated founders on the smell of an oily rag, not burning through cash on highly paid executives.



This cost has real consequences too. Under their proposed allocation of funds, with a minimum $4.8 million raise, Appetise will spend $1.55 million on executive and head office expenses, vs only $2.15 million on marketing. Given that their primary goal over the next few years is to raise their profile, this seems like a ridiculous allocation of capital.

Product


As Appetise is currently only operating in England, the closest I could get to testing Apetise’s product was spending some time clicking through their website. Overall, it was a pretty underwhelming experience. There are three large tabs that block a significant part of the page, which makes scrolling through options difficult, and the colour scheme and overall design feels a little basic. 











On the positive side, they seem to have invested some time into making the mobile experience work well; if anything the site actually seems to work and look better on a mobile phone. It is also worth mentioning that while the prospectus mentions that the business has a national footprint on numerous occasions, their coverage in London is pretty minimal, and at this stage they seem to be focused solely on the city of Birmingham.



The company’s social media presence is similarly disappointing. The prospectus talks a lot about social media engagement through their loyalty scheme, where users can get credit by sharing Appetise on their social network but so far they have failed to get much traction in this area. The Appetise Facebook page seems to only post bad food puns, and each post gets around 2 to 7 likes on average





















(I also noticed that a company director and their marketing executive are two of their most common Facebook fans.) Compare this to Menulog’s page, an Australian food ordering and delivery service, where you’ll see content featuring available restaurants, slightly funnier puns, and as a result much higher engagement with customers. While Facebook posts might seem like a trivial thing to be hung up on in a company review, one of the key things that will affect Appetise’s success is how easily they can build an online following. The fact that so far they have demonstrated little nous in this area is definitely a cause for concern.

Market


Online food ordering is an industry with massive growth potential, and this is probably the main reason Long Hill felt they could get away with the prospectus valuation they have gone for. Appetise has a different model to the likes of Menulog or Deliveroo though, as Appetise does not take part in deliveries, instead, restaurants featured on the Appetise platform need to deliver the food themselves. The idea is this will allow them to scale more easily and not get bogged down with logistical complexities. While I don’t doubt this approach might work in the short term, (and Just Eat, a successful UK company with the same model as Appetise has proven that it can) in the long run an Uber Eats type model of flexible contractors, that can be sent wherever there is demand seems much more efficient. As websites like Uber Eats become more popular and economies of scale start to kick in, I feel there would be an incentive for restaurants to fire their delivery drivers and move from an Appetise type platform to an Uber Eats one.

Appetise makes the argument that their patform is currently cheaper, as Uber Eats charge delivery fees to customers, but just like with Uber, you would assume that these charges will eventually decrease as the site grows in popularity.


Verdict


Appetise’s response to a lot of what I’ve said here would be that the company is uniquely placed to experience explosive growth in the near future. They have a workable website platform, and their only major competitor in the UK Just Eat has demonstrated that there is money to be made in this market. While a $50,00 revenue company with a board of directors looks ridiculous now, if in 12 months’ time their revenue is closer to $1,000,000 no one will be complaining. The problem I have with this argument though is it requires a lot of faith with not much evidence. If Appetise is really uniquely placed to grow so quickly, why not hold off on the prospectus for a few months so they can demonstrate this? Appetise runs on a March end financial year, so their first half FY18 figures should be available now. Once again, the cynic in me thinks that if revenue was actually growing, these figures would be included in the prospectus. 

Even in a growing industry you need to be ahead of the curve and have a clear point of differentiation to succeed, and after reading the Appetise prospectus and looking over their website I simply don’t see this for Appetise. In one of the easier decisions I’ve had to make with this blog so far, I will not be investing in the Appetise IPO.



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