We’re thrilled to extend access to Mirror’s synthetic assets to the Binance Smart Chain community.
SEOUL, South Korea (PRWEB)January 21, 2021
Mirror, the synthetic assets protocol built on the Terra blockchain, has completed the integration of a cross-chain bridge to Binance Smart Chain (BSC) — bringing synthetic assets to the BSC community. The bridge enables porting of Terra’s stablecoin UST, its native token LUNA, governance token MIR, and Mirrored Assets (mAssets) to BSC. Initially, the assets will be rolled out on BSC DeFi applications PancakeSwap and StableXSwap.
“We’re thrilled to extend access to Mirror’s synthetic assets to the Binance Smart Chain community,” says Terraform Labs Co-Founder & CEO, Do Kwon. “The exposure to mAssets via a cross-chain bridge is a powerful avenue for increasing composability and liquidity across blockchain networks, and we welcome the BSC community to Mirror’s community-governed protocol as the next major step in Mirror’s mission to bring synthetic asset exposure to the world.”
Terra’s custom cross-chain bridge was originally built between Terra and Ethereum, enabling Terra assets, such as whitelisted mAssets on Mirror, to be sent from the Terra blockchain to Ethereum. Terra’s BSC integration will now enable users to access mAssets directly from applications running on BSC.
The initial liquidity of mAssets on BSC will be supplemented by the inclusion of mAssets and UST into two of BSC’s leading DeFi protocols — PancakeSwap, an automated market maker (AMM) DEX, and StableXSwap, a stablecoin DEX similar to Curve on Ethereum.
The first mAssets to list on PancakeSwap will be the major tech stocks Tesla, Amazon, Netflix, and Google via their mirrored mAsset versions. On StableXSwap, UST will be listed against BUSD using the platform’s low-slippage bonding curve pool. Rewards for providing liquidity will be issued in Terra’s native token, LUNA, in the coming weeks.
The mAssets can be deployed for a variety of purposes, including use as collateral in lending protocols, used by LPs in yield farming programs, leveraged trading of synthetics, synthetic stable pools (e.g., mBTC/LinearBTC/BTCB), and more.
About Binance Smart Chain
Binance Smart Chain is a sovereign smart contract blockchain delivering Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) compatible programmability. Designed to run in parallel with Binance Chain, Binance Smart Chain retains the former’s fast execution times and low transaction fees while adding Smart Contracts functionality to support compatible dApps.
Mirror is a DeFi protocol powered by smart contracts on the Terra network that enables the creation of synthetic assets called Mirrored Assets (mAssets). mAssets mimic the price behavior of real-world assets and give traders anywhere in the world open access to price exposure without the burdens of owning or transacting real assets. Mirror is a community-governed project that seeks to unlock the wealth creation of major asset classes to users around the world via a permissionless access model.
The SolarWinds attackers appear to have as a primary objective the compromise the authentication method for cloud services, with far-reaching implications. (Credit: Getty Images).
By John P. Desmond, AI Trends Editor
The SolarWinds hackers appeared to have targeted cloud services as a key objective, potentially giving them access to many, if not all, of an organization’s cloud-based services.
Christopher Budd, independent security expert
This is from an account in GeekWire written by Christopher Budd, an independent security consultant who worked previously in Microsoft’s Security Response Center for 10 years.
“If we decode the various reports and connect the dots we can see that the SolarWinds attackers have targeted authentication systems on the compromised networks, so they can log in to cloud-based services like Microsoft Office 365 without raising alarms,” wrote Budd. “Worse, the way they’re carrying this out can potentially be used to gain access to many, if not all, of an organization’s cloud-based services.”
The implication is that those assessing the impact of the attacks need to look not just at their own systems and networks, but also at their cloud-based services for evidence of compromise. And it means that defending against attacks means increasing the security and monitoring of cloud services authentication systems, “from now on.”
Budd cited these key takeaways:
After establishing a foothold in a network, the SolarWinds attackers target the systems that issue proof of identity used by cloud-based services; and they steal the means used to issue IDs;
Once they have this ability, they are able to create fake IDs that allow them to impersonate legitimate users, or create malicious accounts that seem legitimate, including accounts with administrative access;
Because the IDs are used to provide access to data and service by cloud-based accounts, the attackers are able to access data and email as if they were legitimate users.
SAML Authentication Method for Cloud Services Seen Targeted
Cloud-based services use an authentication method called Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML), which issues a token that is “proof” of the identity of a legitimate user to the services. Budd ascertained, based on a series of posts on the Microsoft blog, that the SAML service was targeted. While this type of attack was first seen in 2017, “This is the first major attack with this kind of broad visibility that targets cloud-based authentication mechanisms,” Budd stated.
In response to a question Budd asked Microsoft, on whether the company learned of any vulnerabilities that led to this attack, he got this response: “We have not identified any Microsoft product or cloud service vulnerabilities in these investigations. Once in a network, the intruder then uses the foothold to gain privilege and use that privilege to gain access.”
A response from the National Security Administration was similar, saying the attackers, by “abusing the federated authentication,” were not exploiting any vulnerability in the Microsoft authentication system, “but rather abusing the trust established across the integrated components.”
Also, although the SolarWinds attack came through a Microsoft cloud-based service, it involved the SAML open standard that is widely used by vendors of cloud-based services, not just Microsoft. “The SolarWinds attacks and these kinds of SAML-based attacks against cloud services in the future can involve non-Microsoft SAML-providers and cloud service providers,” Budd stated.
American Intelligence Sees Attack Originating with Russia’s Cozy Bear
American intelligence officials believe the attack originated from Russia. Specifically, according to a report from The Economist, the group of attackers known as Cozy Bear, thought to be part of Russia’s intelligence service, were responsible. “It appears to be one of the largest-ever acts of digital espionage against America,” the account stated.
The attack demonstrated “top-tier operational tradecraft,” according to FireEye, a cyber-security firm that also was itself a victim.
America has tended to categorize and respond to cyber-attacks happening over the last decade according to the aims of the attackers. It has regarded intrusions intended to steal secrets—old-fashioned espionage—as fair game that the US National Security Agency is also engaged in. But attacks intended to cause harm, such as the North Korea assault on Sony Pictures in 2014, or China’s theft of industrial secrets, are viewed as crossing a line, the account suggested. Thus, sanctions have been imposed on many Russian, Chinese, North Korean and Iranian hackers.
The Solar Winds attack seems to have created its own category. “This effort to stamp norms onto a covert and chaotic arena of competition has been unsuccessful,” the Economist account stated. “The line between espionage and subversion is blurred.”
One observer sees that America has grown less tolerant of “what’s allowed in cyberspace” since the hack of the Officer of Personnel Management (OPM) in 2015. That hack breached OPM networks and exposed the records of 22.1 million related to government employees, others who had undergone background checks, and friends and family. State-sponsored hackers working on behalf of the Chinese government were believed responsible.
“Such large-scale espionage “would be now at the top of the list of operations that they would deem as unacceptable,” stated Max Smeets of the Centre of Security Studies in Zurich.
“On-Prem” Software Seen as More Risky
The SolarWinds Orion product is installed “on-prem,” meaning it is installed and run on computers on the premises of the organization using the software. Such products carry security risks that IT leadership needs to carefully evaluate, suggested a recent account ineWeek.
William White, security and IT director, BigPanda
The SolarWinds attackers apparently used a compromised software patch to gain entry, suggested William White, security and IT director of BigPanda, which offers AI software to detect and analyze problems in IT systems. “With on-prem software, you often have to grant elevated permissions or highly privileged accounts for the software to run, which creates risk,” he stated.
Because the SolarWinds attack was apparently executed through a software patch, “Ironically, the most exposed SolarWinds customers were the ones that were actually diligent about installing Orion patches,” stated White.
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The administrator of your personal data will be Threatpost, Inc., 500 Unicorn Park, Woburn, MA 01801. Detailed information on the processing of personal data can be found in the privacy policy. In addition, you will find them in the message confirming the subscription to the newsletter.
The administrator of your personal data will be Threatpost, Inc., 500 Unicorn Park, Woburn, MA 01801. Detailed information on the processing of personal data can be found in the privacy policy. In addition, you will find them in the message confirming the subscription to the newsletter.